Abstract-For a networked controlled system, we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and H ∞ -optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. First, we establish a mean-field system for such games including the effects of adversarial disturbances. Second, we identify the optimal response of the individuals for a given population behavior. Third, we provide an analysis of equilibria and their stability.
II. CROWD-AVERSION PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and let x j,0 ∈ R + be the initial state of generic player j ∈ N , which is realized according to the probability distribution m 0 . The state of player j at time t, denoted by x j,t ∈ R + evolves over a finite horizon T > 0 as
where u j,t ∈ R + is the control input, B j,t is a standard Brownian motion, which is independent of the initial state x j,0 , independent across players and time, α, σ ∈ R and β < 0 are parameters, ζ t is an adversarial disturbance. Let us denote the empirical measures of the states and of the controls at time t by m t = (1/n) n j=1 δ x j,t and z t = (1/n) n j=1 δ u j,t , respectively, where δ is the Dirac measure. In addition, letz t andm t be the mean of the process z t and m t , respectively. Let us introduce the following cost functional with penalty on final state g(·), stage cost function c(·), and quadratic penalty on the unknown disturbance: Players wish to stabilize their states to zero, and therefore we can take for the stage cost c(x j,t , u j,t ,z t , ζ t ) = h(z t )u j,t + a
where h(z t ) is a measure of the "crowd," and thus h(z t )u j,t is a penalty on the control of the single player which is proportional to the crowd in the control loop for the whole system; (a/2)(x j,t ) 2 where a > 0 is the cost of a nonnull state, and (b/2)(u j,t ) 2 where b > 0 accounts for the control energy. The penalty on final state g(x j,T ) = φ(x j,T )
2 , for a given scalar φ > 0, namely it is quadratic with minimum in zero thus penalizing non-null states at the end of the horizon. We assume that the crowd is proportional to the magnitude of the average control, namely
The last equality is obtained by introducing expectations in (1), by considering deterministic disturbance ζ t , and by using indistinguishability, from which we can write:
When n −→ +∞, we have the following robust mean-field game problem [4] , [5] .
Problem 1. (Robust Mean-Field Response Problem):
Let B be a onedimensional Brownian Motion defined on (Ω, F, P), where F is the natural filtration generated by B. Let x 0 be independent of B and with density m 0 (x). Consider the problem in R and
Model (1) may represent a multi-tank system [12] , where the state is the tank level, the control stabilizes the level to zero, while an adversary provides obstacles to this. Model (1) fits also to the case of a power grid, where the state is the rotor angle of each generator, the control operates in order to guarantee transient stability despite the volatility of wind or solar power sources [17] . A third example is given by cyber-physical economic systems; here (1) shares similarity with the Black and Scholes model [7] derived in the context of portfolio selection.
III. THE RESULTING MEAN-FIELD GAME
Let us denote by v t (x) the (upper) value of the robust optimization problem under worst-case disturbance starting from time t at state x. Let the Hamiltonian be given by
where p is the co-state. The next result introduces the mean-field system for the case of crowd-averse CPSs and closed-loop control and disturbance.
Theorem 1:
The closed-loop robust mean-field game for the crowdaverse CPSs takes on the form:
dx and the optimal closed-loop control and disturbance are
(4)
Proof: Given in the Appendix. The significance of the above result is that to find the optimal control input we need to solve the two coupled PDEs in (3) in v and m with given boundary conditions (second and fourth conditions). Any solution of the above system of equations is referred to as worstcase disturbance feedback mean-field equilibrium. The difference with a mean-field equilibrium is that the first PDE is now a HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation involving a minimax optimization and not a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Analogously to the meanfield equilibrium case, such a fixed point can be calculated iteratively solving the HJI equation for fixed m t and by entering the optimal u * t and the worst-case disturbance ζ * t in the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation in (3), until a fixed point in v t and m t is reached.
Remark 1: Let m 0 be absolutely continuous with a continuous density function with finite second moment. Since the running cost is convex in u, and concave in the disturbance ζ, one gets a convexconcave stage cost function that satisfies 
IV. A HEURISTIC APPROACH
In this section, we present a heuristic approach to approximate the mean-field equilibrium and provide performance bounds. The method was first developed in [3] and it is here adapted to the problem at hand. The heuristic approach reframes the problem in an extended state space involving both the state of the player and the average state distribution.
A. Extended State Space
In the next assumption, we consider a lower bound on the rate of change of the meanm t . At the end of this section, we establish a specific value for such a lower bound.
Assumption 1: Suppose there exists a θ > 0 and a correspondingm t such that
In addition to this, let us also assume thatζ t = δm t .
From (2) and substitutingm t by the approximate dynamics
We can then approximate the problem at hand as follows:
where the term (q/2)m 2 t is here introduced to guarantee convexity of the cost as formalized later in Assumption 2.
Reformulating the problem in terms of the expanded state and a new control expressed as
and by completing the square in the objective function we obtain the following linear quadratic problem:
Now the idea is to consider a new value function
Let us take for it the following quadratic expression:
where the matrix P t , must be solution of the differential Riccati equatioṅ
and where
Assumption 2: Parameters q and s are such that
Let P be solution of the above differential Riccati equation, then we know that the optimal value for controlũ is of the form
From the above expression and from (7), it is immediate to derive the current optimal control
and the worst-case disturbance is
Note that if we take the average in (14) then the conditionζ t = δm t in Assumption 1 is satisfied. In addition, a possible value for θ can be obtained by takingm t = 0 for all t in (13) and (14) . By averaging we obtainz * t andζ * t , which we can substitute inṁ t = αm t + βz * t + σζ * t to obtain the following expression:
Bounds for the proposed heuristics when σ = 0 can be obtained as follows. For the lower bound we takem t = 0 for all t and solve the resulting linear quadratic problem. This yields the Riccati equatioṅ
For the upper bound, let us takem t =m 0 for all t, and consider the Taylor expansion π = π 0 +m 0 π 1 . The Riccati equation takes the forṁ
Neglecting higher order infinitesimals, from (15) and collecting all terms in π 1 , we havė
Observing that for a sufficiently smallm 0 , then
Remark 2: Let P 1 be the set of Borel probability measures m on R with finite first order moment and letm be its mean. Also, letc(x,m) :
where d 1 is the Kantorovitch-Rubinstein distance. Then the solution to the game with infinite number of players, namely when n −→ +∞, approximates the game with a finite number of players following the same approximation bounds established in [11] and [14] .
B. Asymptotic Stability and Mean-Field Equilibrium
Using the optimal control and worst-case disturbance (13), (14) in the SDE (1) we obtain
The above SDE is linear and time-varying. The corresponding stochastic process can be studied in the framework of stochastic stability theory [15] . To do this, let us take as Lyapunov function the quadratic function V (x) = Φx 2 , then the stochastic derivative of V (x) is obtained by applying the infinitesimal generator to V (x) which yields
on Q := {x : V (x) ≤ } for some η > 0 and for arbitrarily large , then the origin is asymptotically stable "with probability one," and
for some ψ > 0.
From the above theorem, we have the following result, which establishes exponential stochastic stability of the mean-field equilibrium provided above.
Corollary IV.1:
The interpretation of the above result is that the players stabilize their states to zero asymptotically, while predicting the evolution of congestion as formulated in Problem 1.
We can approximate the mean-field equilibrium, which is captured by the evolution ofm t over the horizon (0, T ], as
Actually, we can derive a differential equation which represents a bound for the mean distribution
s.
TABLE I VARYING SIMULATION PARAMETERS WITH DIFFERENT REGIMES
The equation above corresponds to saying that the mean distribution converges exponentially to zero in absence of the stochastic disturbances (the Brownian motion), under the assumption that ρ is strictly negative.
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Consider a number of players n = 10 3 and a discretized set of states X = {x min , x min + 1, . . . , x max } where x min = 0 and x max = 100 (see parameters in in Table I ). We set α = 0 and β = −1 and consider the influence of ζ t implicitly by increasing the coefficient Q used in the quadratic approximation of the value function v t = Qx 2 . The horizon length is T = 40. We assume m 0 to be Gaussian with mean m 0 between 20 and 70 and standard deviation std(m 0 ) between 1 and 10. We adopt the linear function
The above function represents a linear approximation of h(m, .) with minimal value h min = 0 when the mean distribution is minimal,m = x min , and maximal value h max = 10 2 when the mean distribution is maximal,m = x max . Note that the heuristic method provides linear state feedback control and worst-case disturbance policies. Then the right-hand-side of (2) is linear inm. Furthermore, we approximate ∂ x v t = Qx and thus we replace the optimal production in (4) by
Algorithm Input: Set of parameters as in Table I . The second pattern shows the effects of the Brownian motion. Indeed, the standard deviation std(m t ) as well as sparsity increase with time though the mean distributionm t decreases to zero. Beforē m t reaches zero the standard deviation std(m t ) inverts the slope and drastically decays to zero. This is summarized in Fig. 2 , left. From top to bottom, the figure shows the distribution evolution m t vs. the state x t at different times. The coefficient weighing the Brownian motion increases from top to bottom, and in particular is σ = 0.02 (top), σ = 0.04 (middle), σ = 0.1 (bottom). The graphics on the right column display the time plotm t (solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and the evolution of the standard deviation std(m t ) (dashed line and y-axis labeling on the right). Note that the standard deviation std(m t ) first increases for t ≤ 8 and then drastically decreases to zero.
The third pattern highlights the effects of a higher linear term (Qx/b) in comparison with the constant term (ĥ(m t )/b) in the control input expression (17) . A higher value for Q can be linked back to the effects of the disturbance ζ t . This is shown in Fig. 3 constant whereas (ĥ(.)/b) is strongly decreasing from top to bottom. Apparently, the speed of convergence increases. This is clear from observing the graphics on the right column which display the time plotm t (solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and the evolution of the standard deviation std(m t ) (dashed line and y-axis labeling on the right). Note that both the mean distributionm t and the standard deviation std(m t ) decrease monotonically to zero.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a paradigm for CPSs. Future directions include the study of: i) the connection with risk-sensitive optimal control problems; ii) the vector state case and infinite horizon (with discounted payoff and time-average payoff); and iii) a cyber-physical economic market with some big players and many other small players.
APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem 1:
To obtain (4) let the Hamiltonian be
After differentiation we obtain bu t + h(z t ) + ∂ x v t β = 0 from which we have the expression of u * t (x) in (4). To derive the expression of ζ * t (x), we need to solve sup ζt {−γ 2 ζ 2 t + ∂ x v t σζ t }, from which, after differentiation and assuming concavity on ζ t (see Remark 1), we have 
First note that the second and fourth equations are the boundary conditions and derive straightforwardly from Bellman equations and the evolution of the law of states.
To obtain the HJI, let us replace u appearing in the Hamiltonian (18) Using the above expression of the Hamiltonian in the HJI equation in (19) , we obtain the HJI in (3).
To prove the third equation, which is a PDE representing the FPK equation we simply substitute (4) into the FPK in (19) .
Finally, the ordinary differential equation representing the time evolution form t is simply obtained from (1) by averaging over the state space and this concludes the proof.
